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III.
STATEMENT OF
A.

CASE

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
The Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings before the District Court were detailed

in Appellant's Brief These do not appear to be contested and need not be restated here.
B.

Restatement of Facts
Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC, and Richard Giesler (collectively, "Giesler") incorporate the

Statement ofFacts included in their Appellant's Brief which succinctly summarized the relevant

facts for the Court's consideration. Following the filing of Respondent's Brief Giesler wishes to
reiterate and clarify some of the more essential facts for the Court to consider in this Reply Brief.
As is pertinent to this appeal, Greg Hull ("Hull") sold to Giesler (l) 147 acres of farm
ground (the "147 Acres"), consisting ofa l07-acre parcel that was the subject of the parties'
dispute (the "Property") and a 40-acre parcel that was not in dispute in this litigation (the "40Acre Parcel"); and (2) irrigation equipment located on the 147 Acres used for irrigating of the
147 Acres (the "Irrigation Equipment"). (Memorandum Opinion at 2, 6: R. at 189, 193). The
parties' agreement for the sale of the 147 Acres and Irrigation Equipment was memorialized in a
Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (as amended, the "Purchase

and Sale Agreement") (See Giesler's Exhibit 4), which contained a full integration clause.
(Memorandum Opinion at 4; R. at 191; see also Giesler's Exhibit 4). Subsequently, a Warranty
Deed was executed and recorded covering the 147 Acres. (Memorandum Opinion at 4,6; R. at
191, 193). Accordingly, the District Court found that this first agreement was a final transfer of
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all Hull's legal interest in the 147 Acres and Irrigation Equipment. (Memorandum Opinion at 6;
R. at 193). The District Court did not find that this agreement was breached.
Following the completion of the first agreement, the District Court found the parties
entered a second agreement. This was an oral subdivision/development agreement. Giesler
agreed to divide with Hull one-half of the net profits from the sale of the subdivided lots,
provided Hull timely made payments on the DL Evans Notes secured by the 147 Acres.
(Memorandum Opinion at 6-11; R. at 193-98). Thus, the District Court held that Hull had an
interest in one-half of the net profits from the sale of the subdivided lots. The District Court
found that both parties breached this agreement, but not materially. Despite the absolute
conveyance accomplished by the first contract, the District Court ordered as follows (as is
pertinent to Giesler on this appeal):
4.
Giesler shaH complete aU infrastructure of what has been identified as
Parcell, Parcel 2 and Parcel 3 in the Court's Findings by July 31, 2014, July
31,2015 and July 31, 2016 respectively at his sole expense such that every
platted lot in every subdivision is marketable and in compliance with all zoning
requirements of Twin Falls County unless Hull has forfeited his expectancy
interest as defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Giesler shall use all reasonable
efforts to sell said lots in a commercially reasonable manner taking into
consideration existing real estate marketing conditions. Upon sale of each lot he
shall remit to Hull by cashier's check Y2 ofthe net profits-pro rata-of each lot
based upon development costs to date. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in this
case to resolve any disputes concerning the calculation of net profit. Giesler shaH
not have the right to encumber the property without the mutual consent of
the parties or Court order.
5.
If Giesler fails to timely develop each parcel described above then the
following shaH occur. 1) Hull shall be relieved of making any further
payments to D.L. Evans bank; 2) all developed lots and any undeveloped
land and any appurtenant water shares shall immediately be listed for sale
with a reputable real estate brokerage (other than one in which either party
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has an interest) at fair market value and the net proceeds of sale after the
payment of real estate commissions, closing costs, title insurance, etc) shall be
divided equally between the parties, WITHOUT REIMBURSEMENT TO
GIESLER FOR ANY PREVIOUS EXPENDITURES FOR
DEVELOPMENT COSTS. The failure of Giesler to timely comply with the
development criteria set forth above shall constitute a forfeiture of his right
of reimbursement for development costs. If, upon this occurrence, there
remains any farmable ground from the 107 acres, an independent third party shall
farm the ground on a cash rent basis, the parties shall equally pay the costs of the
farming venture and equally divide and [sic] net profits.

7.
This Judgment shall be recorded and shaH constitute an encumbrance
upon the property identified in the above referenced Exhibit. The parties shall
take all reasonable steps necessary to clear title for the benefit of a third party or
lending institution from this judgment for all lots or acreage sold pursuant to this
judgment.
(Judgment at
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IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

The parties entered two separate contracts, with separate subject matter,
obligations and potential remedies.
At the center of Hull's confusion, and a majority of the District Court's errors, is a

blending of the two separate contracts in this case and potential remedies as between the two. As
sho\vn previously, the first contract between the parties involved the sale of the 147 Acres and
Irrigation Equipment from Hull to Giesler. That agreement was in writing and, as a result of the
full integration clause and executed warranty deed, any other agreements or understandings
related to that subject matter were merged out and foreclosed. To the extent that Hull contends
that he retained any interest in the title to the 147 Acres or Irrigation Equipment, whether legal or
equitable, and the District Court grants any such interest, this holding is erroneous. "The
salutary purpose of (an integration clause) is to preclude consideration of matters extrinsic to the
agreement." Star Phoenix lvfin. Co. v. Hecla A1in. Co., 130 Idaho 223, 233,939 P.2d 542. 552
(1997). The District Court did not find any breach of this agreement, other than Hull's wrongful
subsequent taking of the Irrigation Equipment discussed more fully below.
The second contract was the oral subdivision/development agreement whereby Giesler
promised to give Hull one-half of the net profits from the sale of subdivided lots-not the title to
the Property itself-provided Hull timely made payments on the DL Evans Notes. The District
Court found that this was an express oral contract, thereby eliminating the need for fashioning
equitable remedies. This contract had nothing to do with ownership of the 147 Acres or
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Irrigation Equipment. Rather, if Hull paid the DL Evans Notes on time, he would share equally
in the net profits of the subdivision lots whenever they sold. The District Court found that both
parties breached this second contract-Giesler by failing to develop the Property within an
imputed reasonable time and Hull by failing to make timely payments of the DL Evans Notes. j
However, the District Court also held that these competing breaches by both parties were
immaterial.
B.

Hull failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty for breach of the second
contract.
Upon a finding of breach, either party could have been liable for damages to the other, if

such damages were proved with reasonable certainty. See Harris. Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. &
Trucking, 151 Idaho 761, 770,264 P.3d 400, 409 (2011) quoting Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout
Co .. Inc., 143 Idaho 733,740,152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007) ("The burden is upon the plaintiff to

prove not only that it was injured but that its injury was the result of the defendant's breach; both
amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty."). Further, "[i]t is wellestablished that equitable remedies will not be allowed if adequate remedies are available at
law." Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89,105,218 P.3d 1150,1166 (2009) citing
Meikle v. Watson, 138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100,103 (2003). Therefore, Hull had the burden

of proving (l) damages for Giesler's breach with reasonable certainty or (2) that there were no
adequate remedies available at law-both of which he failed to do.

I In the Respondent's Brief, Hull contends that the District COUl1 found that the timeliness of his performance was
sufficient. The District Court actually held that Hull had not fulfilled his obligation to make timely payments of the
DL Evans Notes and was in breach. However, the District Court deemed the breach immaterial because Giesler had
failed to require strict performance of Hull's obligation by accepting late payments on the DL Evans Notes.
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When it comes to actual damages, the Respondent's Brief focuses largely on the price per
acre paid by Giesler for the 147 Acres. However, this is erroneous because it again blends the
first contract (purchase and sale) and the second contract (subdivision/ development). The
breach of the oral subdivision/development agreement is not at all tied to the first contract and
the consideration paid for the sale of the 147 Acres and Irrigation Equipment. The consideration
paid by Hull on the second contract in order to secure a one-half interest in the profits of the
subdivided lots upon their sale, does not literally or figuratively diminish or increase the "price
per acre" received on the first contract. Even if the two contracts could somehow be mixed, Hull
presented no direct evidence at trial regarding the value of the Property-whether subdivided or
not. Accordingly, this cannot serve as a reasonably certain basis for damages.
Additionally. as to damages, the Respondent 's Bri~lclaims that Hull paid $161,580.17 on
the DL Evans Notes. However, this is not what the District Court found. Rather, the District
Court tabulated all amounts paid by Hull to Giesler based off of Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, then
assumed, for argument's sake, that all payments that did not contain a memo designation or
contained an ambiguous memo designation were payments on the DL Evans Notes and found
that "Hull's assertion that he paid all of his obligations under the contract for the D.L. Evans loan
is just as credible as Giesler's assertion that he did not." (Memorandum Opinion at 14, R. at
201). A large portion of that amount claimed as DL Evans payments-approximately
$ 123,744.00-consisted of undesignated or ambiguous funds. The District Court could not tell
what these payments were actually for and did not specifically allocate them. In fact, when the
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District Court's analysis attempted to walk through a timeline of payments in order to ascertain
whether Hull had paid the DL Evans Notes on time, the District Court found that
Hull did not make this specific type of argument at trial. He did assert that he
made all D.L. Evans payments. Giesler asserted that he made none. The parties'
accountings and exhibits are "result oriented' and are not contemporaneous with
anything they actually intended regarding how Hull's payments were to be
applied.
(Memorandum Opinion at 17; R. at 204) (emphasis added). Thus, the District Court expressly
found that Hull did not present evidence or argument as to specific allocation or the intent for
which these payments would be applied. Rather, the District Court merely used this
methodology to disapprove of Giesler's assertion that Hull had not made any of the payments on
the DL Evans Notes.
The District Court's analysis goes both ways. If it is just as likely as not that the
payments were for the DL Evans Notes, then Hull has failed to meet his burden of proving that
the payments were for the DL Evans Notes and, thus, has failed to prove damages with
reasonable certainty. In essence, Hull's proof of damages consisted of taking every payment he
had made to Giesler over their six-year course of dealings and throwing it against the wall to see
what would stick. What was left was an approximation of what was paid on the DL Evans
Notes-among payments for various other amounts owed to Giesler that are not subject to this
appeal. This Court has held that such an approximation does not amount to reasonable certainty.
See Harris. Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 P.3d 400, 409 (2011)

(plaintiffs proof of damages "around $147,000.00" was not reasonably certain). Hull had the
burden of proving damages with reasonable certainty. The District Court found that the actual
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application ofa large portion of the funds claimed by Hull as payments on the DL Evans Notes
to be only 50/50-with neither application more plausible than the other. Accordingly, Hull has
failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty. Due to Hull's failure to present evidence of
damages with reasonable certainty and to prove that his legal remedies were inadequate, the
District Court erred by fashioning any remedy at all.
C.

The District Court's remedy for breach of the second contract was erroneous.
Even if this Court finds that Hull satisfied his burden of proving damages with reasonable

certainty, the remedy imposed by the District COUli was erroneous. The District Court fashioned
a remedy akin to strict performance of the second contract within jUdicially-imposed time
frames-with little or no factual support in the record as to reasonableness-and creating severe
penalties in the event of failure. However, this Court has held that strict performance is an
"extraordinary remedy" to be imposed only when legal remedies are inadequate. Fullerton v.
Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 823, 136 P.3d 291,294 (2006).

The District Court's order was also

inconsistent with its own holding that equitable remedies would be denied based on the existence
of the express contract. Furthermore, the District Court tied its strict performance standards to
penalties that are not only unenforceable because of their severe and arbitrary nature, but because
they are tied to Giesler's fee title in the Property itself.
The Appellant's Brief goes into greater detail concerning the District Court's errors and
the legal reasoning therefor. These arguments need not be repeated. However, it cannot be
overemphasized that the second contract (the oral subdivision/development agreement) had
nothing to do with the title to the Property transferred by the first contract (the purchase and
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sale). Thus, it is not legally nor logically justified to create a remedy that seeks to undo the fully
integrated and completed purchase and sale contract. The District Court had no greater authority
to fashion a remedy stripping Giesler oftitle to the Property than it had to strip Giesler of title to
any other real propeliy and force the sale thereof. The remedy simply bears no relation to the
purpose of the contract.
Hull contends, and the District Court apparently agreed, that this remedy would put the
parties in the same position that they were in prior to the contract. However, the District Court's
remedies place Hull in a better position than he was prior to the second contract because it gives
him back an interest in the Property itself, which improperly affects the parties' rights under the
first contract. If the Court sought to restore the parties to the status quo, then (1) Giesler must be
returned the $200,000.00 he paid to Hull on the first 40 of the 147 Acres, and (2) Hull would be
reimbursed for any amounts paid on the DL Evans Notes that were actually proven with
reasonable certainty. Thus, the effects of the second contract would be undone and the parties
could then each go their separate ways with Giesler holding fee title to the 147 Acres and
Irrigation Equipment and Hull having suffered no loss on the second contract. Any difficulty in
determining the amount necessary to accomplish this restoration did not arise because the legal
damages were inadequate, but because Hull failed to meet his evidentiary burden for a
foundational component of his case, namely, whether Giesler caused him to suffer any damage at
all and the amount of such damage, if any.
As for a reasonable time for performance, the District Court found that one year was
reasonable for each remaining phase. However, requiring Giesler to complete all development
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within three years, regardless of any other factor, leaves the possibility that this productive
ground will be wholly converted into 107 acres of empty lots just waiting to be sold. The scarce
evidentiary support for a finding of a reasonable timeframe for performance was outlined in the
Appellant's Brief. Perhaps the reason for the scarce evidence in the record on this point is due to

the fact that strict performance was not pled, or even sought, by Hull, and Giesler was not on
notice that he needed to present evidence of reasonable times for completion of the development
going forward.
In the Respondent's Brief, Hull contends that the Amended Complaint contained a catchall requesting "all other relief that the Court deems just and equitable in the premises." (R. at
144). However, this broad stroke cannot place upon Giesler the burden of producing evidence to
counter every conceivable theory of remedy which was omitted by Hull's pleadings. Hull's
pleadings consistently sought rescission ofthe land purchase (the first contract), payment of one
half of the value of the Property or sale of the Property and a split of the proceeds. All of these
remedies are inappropriate and improperly center on the title to the Property. The District Court
erred by going beyond what was requested and ordering strict performance of the second
contract within judicially-imposed time frames-with little or no factual support in the record as
to reasonableness-and creating severe penalties in the event of failure.
In the Respondent's Brief; Hull raises several assertions and suppositions of what the
District Court could have done to fashion a remedy for Hull's damages. However, all the
remedies proposed either ignore Hull's burden to actually prove damages with reasonable
certainty or blend together the two separate contracts. The remedies for breach of the second
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contract cannot relate to an interest in the land. The agreement was found to be an express oral
contract. Giesler never agreed to transfer any sort of interest in the land itself to Hull and the
District Court agreed, holding that the oral contract only concerned an interest in one-half of the
net profits from the sale of subdivided lots.
Hull contends that the statute of frauds would not apply to foreclose such a transfer of
interest in land because it was not a transfer of a "legal" interest. This contention is without
citation to authority or further argument by Hull. The statute of frauds does not make such a
distinction. Giesler contends that any implication that the second agreement concerned an
interest in the Property itself runs afoul of the statute of frauds and any remedy for breach of the
second contract cannot be tied to the fee title to the Property. There were workable legal
remedies available to Hull had he met his evidentiary burden. However, he failed to do so and
the District Court erred by relieving Hull from the strategic shortcomings of his case by
imposing equitable remedies where they were inappropriate.
Hull contends that the District Court's remedies did not rewrite the second contract
between the parties but merely impose a reasonable time for performanee. If this is the case,
then the penalty and forfeiture clauses would have, of necessity, been a part ofthe original
bargain reached by the parties. However, this is not what the District Court found. The District
Court found an express oral contract whereby Giesler promised to give Hull one-half of the net
profits from the sale of subdivided lots on the Property if Hull paid the DL Evans Notes on time.
Nowhere in the A1emorandum Decision did the District Court find that the parties agreed upon a
timeframe for performance or damages for breach. These were added by the District Court in
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order to require strict performance and to make the agreement more "equitable" to Hull. This
was outside of the District Court's authority. See Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates,

c., 140

Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004) ("Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite
contracts in order to make them more equitable. ").
Hull claims that "it would be unjust to let Giesler sit on the property indefinitely and
retain the farming income, until Hull loses his interest for failure to pursue." (Respondent's Brief
at 14). There simply was insufficient evidence regarding what time for performance would be
reasonable. This was a failure in Hull's pleadings and the presentation of Hull's claims.
Furthermore, Giesler could not sit indefinitely on the Property, Hull would simply have to bring
a lawsuit and prove damages, as would any party confronted with a breach of contract.
However, as argued above, Hull failed to do this. The District Court's analysis and conclusions
erroneously overlook these shortcomings and grant equitable relief nonetheless.

D.

The District Court's award for the value of the Irrigation Equipment and the
incorporation of the Irrigation Equipment into the calculation of net profits was
erroneous.
The District Court found that Giesler purchased all of the Irrigation Equipment outright.

The District Court found that Hull removed the Irrigation Equipment, but then only awarded
Giesler one half of the value of the equipment Hull wrongfully took. The District Court's award
is inconsistent with its prior holding and incompatible with Giesler's outright ownership of the
Irrigation Equipment. Making matters even worse, in addition to only awarding Giesler one-half
of the value of the Irrigation Equipment, the District Court held that Hull would be credited with
a pro rata value of the Irrigation Equipment in the calculation of net profits from the sale of
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subdivided lots. If Giesler O\vns the equipment outright, as the District Court found and as the
evidence in the record supports, it is unclear how Hull should receive credit for any amounts
related to the Irrigation Equipment now or in the future calculation of net profits. The District
Court erred by holding otherwise. Accordingly, the calculation of "net profits" should strike any
reference to the value of the Irrigation Equipment and Giesler should be awarded an additional
$12,561.00 representing the one-half of the value of the Irrigation Equipment that was
erroneously credited to Hull.

v.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, in addition to the arguments contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Giesler respectfully contends that the District Court's remedies for breach of the second contract
(the oral subdivision/development agreement) are erroneous because (1) Hull failed to prove
damages with reasonable certainty; (2) they improperly impinge on Giesler's ownership rights
acquired through the first contract (the purchase and sale agreement); and (3) they are
unreasonable and/or unenforceable and overly severe penalties. Giesler additionally contends
that the District Court erred in its award relative to the Irrigation Equipment. Accordingly,
Giesler respectfully requests that this Court grant the relief requested by the Appellant's Brief
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